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Abstract:   
  
Spanish cities have suffered increasing social inequality after the 2008 economic 
crisis and austerity policies. However, harshening social conditions have also led 
to ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin and Nielsen, 2008). Against the background of 
Marshallian and Tocquevillean takes on citizenship and civil society this paper 
analyses the emergence of the political confluence that gained office in the 
municipal elections of May 2015 in Barcelona incorporating citizens’ 
organizations and advocacy groups. Barcelona en Comú claims a radical change 
in policy orientation with a renewed citizenship agenda. We argue that this is an 
example of Urban Citizenship that requires historical contextualization. We see 
continuities and discontinuities between the current local governance model and 
agenda and the democratic local governance model established during the 1980s 
when civil society provided significant input. However, it is a challenge to 
implement an urban citizenship agenda in a globalised city with resources 
controlled elsewhere.  
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Introduction 
In this article we show how in cities diverse citizenship practices can yield a 
combination of two citizenship agendas, one belonging to the sphere of social 
rights and the other to the sphere of political participation and democratic values. 
The article joins previous debates published in this Journal concerning the 
conceptualization of citizenship beyond the nation state. More specifically, this is 
a contribution to a body of research into urban citizenship and aims to provide 
nuances to general propositions concerning citizenship beyond the nation state. 
A substantive body of studies on citizenship and the welfare state follow 
the legacy of Marshallian citizenship with its focus on social rights (Esping 
Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1989; Taylor-Gooby, 2009; Revi, 2014). However, with 
the transformation of the welfare state (reducing its redistributive capacity) the 
conditionalization of claims is challenging the principle of equal rights for all 
citizens (Faist, 2013; Somers, 2008). The resilience of the welfare state in 
supporting social citizenship has been uneven with the relative triumph of neo-
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liberal ideas over social democratic models (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). Moreover, in 
recent years under the pressure of fiscal austerity the reduction and privatization 
of public services have left new or inadequately met social needs in their wake.  
In a different vein, studies have signalled the need to re-think the main 
assumptions behind citizenship in contemporary and globalized societies, where 
transnational social flows and state re-shaping are leading to new social, cultural 
and political loyalties. This raises the question what it means to be a member of 
a polity (Bauböck & Guiraudon, 2009; Kivisto and Faist, 2007). At the same time 
it shows that the quality of citizenship is mediated by cultural differences and by 
fragmentation of formal incorporation in a polity (Isin & Turner, 2002; Lister, 2007; 
Morris, 2009; Soysal, 2012). This rich literature takes us beyond of the scope of 
this article, but confirms the significance of citizenship as a body of rights that not 
only protects against need but also provides meaning to holders of those rights. 
It is our aim to focus on citizenship, as a method of inclusion at the local 
scale and as an expression of social and political participation involving the 
formulation of new claims as well as the defence of existing rights (Beauregard & 
Bounds, 2000; Isin, 2000). Our concern is with the contribution to citizenship by 
social movements that claim ‘the right to the city’ in the particular governance 
context of Barcelona and in the economic environment of fiscal austerity. We 
have observed that those citizens who claim more transparent political 
participation also claim substantive social rights. Our analysis draws attention to 
the limitation of seeing citizenship only as a body of rights granted by the state, 
and sees the city as a powerful public sphere where new definitions of citizenship 
emerge. (Boudreau, 2000; Blokland et al.; 2015; Garcia, 2006; Holston, 1999; 
Isin, 2007; Mayer, 2009; Purcell, 2003). We contextualise a social and political 
rights discourse as articulated by a political movement, Barcelona en Comu, 
sprung from earlier civic movements in Barcelona in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial and economic crisis. 
Citizenship is also ‘essential for cultivating civic virtues and democratic 
values’ (Isin & Turner, 2007, 5). Although T.H. Marshall’s evolutionary account of 
the expansion of citizenship (civic, social and political rights) recognized the civic 
dimension he emphasised the redistributive capacity of citizenship within 
capitalism. For him citizenship enhanced ‘a growing interest in equality as a 
principle of social justice’ (1950, 40).  Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the 
United States a distinctive way of citizen participation and their sense of 
membership in civil society. In his legacy Isin & Turner see a historical path that 
has characterised the national identity and incorporation of immigrants in the 
United States and has given prominence to civic (and human) rights over social 
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rights (Isin & Turner, 2007). The citizens that Tocqueville observed in Democracy 
in America exercise civil responsibility and their voluntary and community 
organizations in towns and villages all contribute to local democracy. His 
emphasis on that capacity to organise autonomously (outside the orbit of the 
state) has prompted a wealth of interpretations and debates. 
If Tocqueville saw America ‘as a nation of joiners’ (Kivisto and Faist, 2007, 
84), Robert Putnam took a more pessimist view in his Bowling Alone: America’s 
Declining Social Capital. Putnam’s contribution is relevant to our argument since 
he offers an institutional analysis of degrees of civic engagement and 
incorporates social capital as part of the explanation of the cooperation and trust 
that develops with such engagement (Kivisto and Faist, 2007, 85). The conditions 
and characteristics of such civic engagement may also help to ‘shape’ the social 
action of advocacy groups. In this context the ‘civic’ assumes a contestatory 
function (Edwards and Foley, 2001, 6). Taking our cue from this expanded role 
of civil society we can see how active participation at grass-root level within and 
at the margins of the public sphere can strengthen democracy (Mayer, 2009; 
Eizaguirre et al., 2012, 2010). The case we present illustrates the value of 
cooperation and trust among members of advocacy groups and social 
movements (bottom-up organizations) that have worked their way into local 
governance in a particular institutional environment. Our argument is that the 
ways in which the local public sphere and governance dynamics have evolved in 
Barcelona partially explains the achievements of the social movements. 
The specific case of Barcelona supports the argument that Marshall’s 
emphasis on welfare and social rights is compatible with the neo-Tocqueville 
tradition that stresses civic-society participation. Civic engagement was 
welcomed and promoted, in the recent democratic history of Barcelona, by the 
local governance coalition that long influenced urban citizenship in the city 
(Blackeley, 2005; Degen & Garcia, 2012). Engaging civic groups in the policies 
of the governing coalition of the 1980s and 1990s  also encouraged practices that 
we call ‘bottom-linked’ social action. This served not only to provide services and 
mechanisms of participation to citizens and immigrants but also to organize 
contestation and struggle against perceived social injustices. 
Citizenship is then a process (democracy) and  a target (social justice). We 
take the city (Barcelona) as the political territory with a public sphere in which 
political and social rights claims historically gave rise to socio-economic 
redistributive programmes implemented by the city council in the period 1979-
2011. From 2011 this governance model was abandoned by a conservative local 
government. Barcelona is a contemporary example of a city obliged to deal with 
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the consequences of the 2008 financial and economic crisis and in particular with 
the consequences of national top-down imposition of new modes of regulation 
affecting life chances (employment) and life conditions (housing and services).  
The historical combination of austerity programmes -involving cuts in 
public services - with the loss of employment, given a market-oriented local 
government (2011-2015), has fuelled renewed interest in urban politics and social 
involvement especially among the young, just when many studies were 
presenting the young generation as passive. This has created a new interest in 
political participation, illustrated by the emergence of a ’new political culture’ from 
the meetings on May 15, 2011 in central squares throughout the country to 
discuss how to change the social and political environment of the city and the 
nation.  ’Barcelona en Comú’ (Barcelona in common) shows the transformation 
of a locally based social movement in defence of social rights and of participatory 
democracy into a governing coalition. This new local government is the result of 
political confluence among social movements and parties.  Similar coalitions 
have emerged in several cities in Spain. 
 
The economic crisis and local responses: civil society & anti-austerity 
urban social movements in Spain (2008-2014) 
Between 2008 and 2011 among the effects of the bursting of the housing bubble 
were a dramatic increase in unemployment and a worsening of social conditions 
for both working and middle classes. One of the consequences was the rise in 
housing evictions of families unable to meet their mortgage payments. The 
Spanish housing system is based on wide-spread ownership strongly related to 
the familistic conservative Southern European welfare culture in which family 
solidarity is paramount in promoting intergenerational economic support (Ferrera, 
2005). This model has encouraged ‘privatised Keynesianism’ (Crouch, 2011) for 
the working class and large sectors of the middle class. It has interacted well with 
the incremental welfare state expansion that occurred until the 2008 crisis. Family 
solidarity has grown stronger since then to cope with unemployment and housing 
needs resulting from the bursting of the housing bubble and from the austerity 
programmes implemented since 2010. Social housing was never widely 
extended in Spain, especially if compared with Northern European countries 
(Pareja-Eastaway & Varo, 2002; Leal, 2010). This helps to understand the social 
response to the housing evictions after 2008 (De Weerdt & Garcia, 2015). 
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Young families evicted from their homes have returned to their parents’ 
homes, as the young unemployed have also done. Community solidarity has re-
emerged at the family and neighbourhood levels with the support of civic society 
and church NGOs such as Caritas. This family and community response could 
have been predicted. Less predictable, however, was the emergence of a wide 
social movement capable of organizing the evicted and of engineering socially 
innovative practices in order to defend the right to a decent home. The Platform 
of Mortgage Victims (PAH)1 movement emerged in 2009 in Barcelona, and 
spread gradually to other cities of the Barcelona region and the rest of Spain. 
The PAH movement had wide impact.. By reframing the issue of housing 
as a collective instead of an individual debt problem its innovative actions  
contributed to new ways of conceptualizing and approaching policy problems. 
While governments used an ‘individual approach’ the PAH  focused on collective 
responses to social problems (Pradel et al., 2013). Secondly, the political actions 
of the PAH influenced governance by pushing for the creation of new 
mechanisms for collectively negotiating housing debts with financial institutions. 
It also politically influenced new local and regional regulations for access to 
housing for mortgage victims (De Weerdt and Garcia, 2015). Thirdly, the methods 
of organization of this movement were instrumental for the Barcelona en 
Comú platform we analyse in this article. 
The Indignados movement that started in 2011 was a catalyst for different 
initiatives against the welfare cuts. The movement, initiated in a gathering in 
central public spaces of Spanish cities on May 15 of that year demanded ‘a real 
democracy’ after the imposition of the national budget cuts by supranational 
institutions coinciding with the disclosure of corruption among economic and 
political elites. The initial demonstration developed into a permanent 
concentration in the main cities of Spain, including Madrid and Barcelona, where 
people deliberated on political reform and the ways to ensure social rights. In this 
framework, movements like PAH could explain their actions and proposals for 
social change, solicit support and become more visible. The  movement 
organised thematic commissions made up of citizens and proposed a political 
                                                          
1  In Spanish: Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca was created in 2009 as a self-
organisation mechanism grouping owners unable to pay their mortgage and being evicted 
from their dwelling and renters with low income in danger of being evicted. Platform main 
actions have been collective actions to stop evictions, negotiation with banks and city councils 
to find allocation for people being evicted and the promotion of laws against housing evictions 
and energy poverty. , see: http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/ 
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program. Moreover, the Indignados undertook political actions to stop what they 
considered anti-social policies. Some of the first, more striking mobilisations were 
actions to surround the parliaments in Madrid and Barcelona with the aim of 
obstructing parliamentary meetings and stopping the adoption of new austerity 
laws. 
The Indignados movement and the PAH movement have, in sum, 
formulated specific alternative citizenship agendas. These citizenship agendas 
defined membership beyond formal and legal citizenship status (De Koning et 
al.,2015), and gave a strong role to non-state actors in the definition of priorities 
concerning the defence of social rights. In this regard, the Indignados’ new 
citizenship agenda included a particular claim for more democratic control over 
decisions that have an impact on citizens’ lives. 
The Indignados and PAH movements insisted that governing institutions should 
respect and enforce formal citizenship rights already recognised but implemented 
only partially or put on hold by the austerity programmes. These movements 
attest to the resilience of the welfare state by coming to its defence and 
supporting the precedence of social rights over the needs of the market. Social 
action also happened around specific welfare services and in working places. For 
example, the public health sector organized in their hospitals and manifested their 
strength by demonstrating in the streets. From these actions it can be argued that 
the defence of social citizenship was very much an urban phenomenon.  
In electoral terms, the rise of these movements signified a weakening of 
public support for ruling parties. Even so, a new conservative local government 
was elected in Barcelona, and in the national elections in November 2011 the 
conservative party (Popular Party) won an absolute majority. Both results 
facilitated the implementation of austerity measures against the opposition of the 
parliamentary minority. The social movement’s political discourses and political 
actions were strongly criticised by the governing political class on the grounds of 
not being representative and of the naivety of their ideas. There was even an 
attempt to repress the movement by the introduction of norms which prevented 
massive social gatherings in public squares for political purposes while also 
limiting the right to demonstrate near parliaments. 
While the Indignados presence in the public sphere and in the central 
squares waned and its members moved their actions to the neighbourhoods, 
the PAH movement gained prominence in the media as the numbers of home 
evictions increased yearly. By 2013 this movement covered all 17 regions of 
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Spain and enjoyed the support of 81% of the Spaniards2 whereas only 10%3 of 
the population reported trusting the government. The presence of members of 
the PAH in the public sphere became more conspicuous particularly with specific 
actions such as the People’s Legislative Initiative (ILP, a mobilisation effort that 
collected almost triple the officially required number of signatures - a total of 
1,402,854- to propose legislation to ease housing debt repayment (De Weerdt & 
Garcia, 2015). 
During the 2011-2015 period new political platforms emerged in Spanish 
cities or networked within and between regions incorporating the citizenship 
agendas articulated by the Indignados movement and using the new forms of 
organisation of the Indignados and the PAH movements. These new political 
platforms are very rooted in their localities and their networking capacity has 
stimulated cooperation and trust among movement members. In the elections in 
May 2015 these platforms had considerable success at local level but less impact 
at regional level. In Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Zaragoza, and other large 
Spanish cities these new political formations gained office being the first or 
second political force, whereas no region was governed thereafter by new 
electoral platforms and coalitions. It is in this wider political context that the case 
of Barcelona becomes particularly significant. By examining Barcelona en Comú 
we want highlight its organizing capacity as civic movement and its defence of a 
citizenship agenda as key elements for their political success in the local elections 
in May 2015.   
Barcelona: a tradition of civil society engagement in local governance and 
local welfare 
There are continuities and differences between the governance model of 
Barcelona that emerged from 1979 onwards and the current governance situation 
under BeC. In 1979 local elections brought considerable collaboration between 
the city council and social movements linked to neighbourhood associations. 
During the dictatorship’s last period these associations had articulated demands 
for improving neighbourhoods with claims for social and political rights (Andreu, 
2015) . The new city council, formed by a left-wing coalition led by the Socialist 
                                                          
2  http://www.metroscopia.org/datos-recientes/tag/metroscopia-dinamico/PAH, consulted in march 2013 
3  CIS, Centre of Sociological research, 
http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/EN/11_barometros/Indicadores_PI/documentos/serGobOpo1.html 
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Party, combined redistributive urban programmes (including local infrastructures 
and services) in which citizens participated in urban and social planning with the 
incorporation of local private actors in strategies for economic growth. This 
approach combined aims of economic growth and social cohesion using the 
instruments of strategic planning. This so-called ‘Barcelona Model’ relied to 
largely on the creation of mechanisms for intervention by different local actors in 
decision-making processes but with strong leadership of the public sector in a 
consensus building environment (Capel, 2007). Through this model the city 
council promoted local welfare with the involvement of civil society in the provision 
of services, such as active advocacy groups and third sector organizations. There 
is another interpretation of why the city government integrated civil society groups 
into governance: this refers to the limited financial resources the municipality had 
for  implementing an ambitious social programme (Blackeley, 2005; Wollmann, & 
Iglesias, 2011). In any case, the development of this governance model, 
combining participation of civil society and redistributive policies, strengthened 
forms of urban citizenship and a Barcelona identity  
 
This model enabled  urban civil society groups and social movements to 
influence the policy agenda in order to implement previous political demands, but 
in over time it led to the co-optation of some of their leaders and their 
transformation into members of the political elite, eventually ‘abandoning’ their 
loyalties to their grass-roots. The influence by grass-roots movements was, 
however, strong during the eighties, with important interventions in working class 
neighbourhoods and in the inner-city: New public spaces were opened 
substituting old factories or new facilities were provided such as cultural centres, 
libraries, health centres and primary and secondary schools. The opportunity to 
host the Olympic Games in 1992 brought massive private and public investments, 
the latter coming from national and regional levels of government. The Olympic 
mega-project gathered a wide consensus amongst city actors as it brought major 
investments in large infrastructures and public spaces that were seen as 
necessary for the city. Nevertheless the decision-making processes related to the 
development of such infrastructures diminished the role of citizens and weakened 
the capacity of neighbourhood associations and other social groups to negotiate 
new demands with the city council with some exceptions (Degen & Garcia, 2012). 
  
During the second half of the nineties, in a context of an economic crisis 
and higher unemployment (1994-1997), the city council changed its governance 
style towards managerialism. The shift was meant to give Barcelona the capacity 
to compete in the global arena and to ensure efficiency in a context of integration 
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of the city into the global markets. With the internationalisation of Barcelona 
private actors got more influence on the council while weakening the capacity of 
neighbourhood associations to monitor political decisions. The  outcome was a 
widening of the council’s distance from many citizens' groups and social 
movements, which disagreed increasingly with the competitive model of urban 
growth. Many were disappointed about losing their right to decide the future of 
the city. The dissent of civic organizations was evident with the celebration of 
another mega-project, the 2004 Forum of Cultures which - although a UNESCO 
event with the theme of cultural diversity and global peace - aimed mainly at the 
urban redevelopment of the east side of the city.  
 
To reverse citizens' discontent the city council started to implement new 
policies at neighbourhood level after the 2007 elections, but citizen disaffection 
with the local government continued to grow for a number of reasons: the 
increase in housing prices; frequent conflicts between some councillors and the 
counter-hegemonic movements in the city; the enforcement of laws that regulated 
public space to the detriment of the poor and of marginal groups (Galdon-Clavell, 
2015). The 2008 economic crisis resulted in higher unemployment and brought 
the disclosure of local cases of corruption. Finally, in the context of the 15M 
mobilisations, the local elections in 2011 brought into power a minority local 
government led by conservative nationalists, bringing to an end 31 years of 
socialist governments in the city4. This spelled the end of a governance model 
that had allowed grass-roots organizations to dialogue with the city council.  
Barcelona en Comú as an urban citizenship platform that incorporates 
proposals of civil society and social movements  
The political platform Barcelona en Comú (BeC) was one of the political 
responses of the Indignados movement to a local political class whose legitimacy 
had been eroded by their management of the economic crisis and by its aloofness 
towards citizens. The proposal to launch this platform emerged from a small 
group of activists who were especially active in the anti-eviction movement (PAH) 
during the period 2009-2013 and who were involved with the Observatory of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (DESC), a non-profit organisation that 
collaborates with social movements and gives legal advice and training in the 
                                                          
4  Between 1979 and 2011 the Socialist party (PSC) ruled the city, without absolute majority, except 
for the period 2001-2004. The party always found support from the postcommunist party ICV, which 
was in charge of welfare policies. Later, ICV would be one of the participants in the new electoral 
platform BeC. 
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defence of social rights5. Members of DESC are well-connected with social 
movements and advocacy groups and have played an important role as 
facilitators for networking . The small group of DESC, led by the charismatic 
spokeswoman of PAH until 2013, Ada Colau, launched the BeC political platform 
in June 2014. They wanted to be different from traditional parties and adopted 
practices from the Indignados movement. The platform was a proposal for a 
confluence of social and political movements rather than a consolidated political 
project. During the summer of 2014 the platform petitioned for support and in one 
month and a half collected the signatures of some 30.000 citizens. It was nurtured 
by people from the social movements at neighbourhood level and from traditional 
left-wing political parties. Academics, technical staff of the city council and people 
that had mobilized during the 15M protests also started to collaborate with the 
initiative6. As for the number of people involved, there is no proper census of 
militants in the platform and the talk is of  ‘collaborators’, which makes tallying 
difficult. Nevertheless, thousands of citizens did participate at different stages in 
the creation of the platform.  
  
The BeC platform was not organised as a traditional political party but 
created horizontal mechanisms of decision making inspired by the 15M 
movement, especially regarding the elaboration of a program for the local 
government. The basic organisation of the platform was based on two kinds of 
commissions where citizens gather and discuss the needs of the city and the 
development of a political program. One kind followed the model of debates in 
the central Plaça Catalunya during the 15M; these are thematic commissions 
dealing with different issues such as gender, urbanism, participation and 
democracy, environment, or health and were created to stimulate political debate 
and to propose specific measures in the election campaign. The second kind of 
commission followed a decentralisation logic, being territorially-based. 
Neighbourhood commissions acted following the tradition of the neighbourhood 
movements of the city collected neighbourhoods claims and ensured the 
                                                          
5  DESC is a think tank on the issue of citizenship led by a senior ex- city councillor, and social 
scientist who has published articles and books on social rights and urban citizenship. 
6 A deep empirical analysis of the social background of those participating in the movement is 
still pending. Nevertheless, observation of different commissions shows the strong role that academics, 
most of them young researchers in precarious job situations played in the thematic debates during the 
elaboration of the program. The role of the technical staff is relevant as it provided inside information, 
especially on issues linked to transparency. Finally, people,already involved in debates during the 15M 
movement, were also involved with the platform to different degrees, from simple participation in 
commissions to being part of the coordination committees. 
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territorial implantation of the platform. One of the features of this form of 
organization is that, despite being clearly open to program demands of social 
movements, it was based on individual participation and not on party or group 
affiliation. This  means no formal representation of social movements, political 
parties, trade unions or other organisations is accepted: members are called to 
participate on an individual basis at neighbourhood level or/and in thematic 
discussions, together with non-affiliated citizens. Debates and proposals in 
thematic and neighbourhood commissions were partially carried over from 
debates initiated during the 15M movement, with some of the participants having 
been part of the 15M commissions in 2011.  
 
In sum, the BeC organization uses horizontal tools of decision-
making (based on thematic and territorial logics) but without formal involvement 
of social movements in the electoral program. In this way, members of old and 
new social movements as well as advocacy groups could participate in setting 
the political program of the platform together with unaffiliated citizens. This ‘open’ 
mechanism allowed to incorporate in the electoral program proposals from 
advocacy groups and social movements. Following Diani (2001: 209) we see the 
political impact of these groups on policy design and on the activities at all stages 
of ‘the political’. We also see a cultural impact on the processes of production and 
reproduction of moral standards, information, knowledge and life practices. The 
objective of political impact was not only to attain power at the local level but to 
propose the transformation of policy processes. In terms of cultural impact, the 
platform tried to frame policy debates proposing different moral standards and 
hoping to carry these over into policy implementation. These objectives recall 
debates already occurring during the eighties, when the previous redistributive 
model was developed by the socialist-left coalition. In both historical instances a 
‘bottom-linked’ articulation between civil society, social movements and 
institutions developed in Barcelona.   
Table 1 shows some initiatives included in the electoral program of BeC 
and the specific advocacy groups that were active before the political project was 
articulated to win the local elections. The strength of the connection between BeC 
and these groups and social movements varies. In some cases, such as the 
activists claiming democratic regeneration, there was a strong involvement in the 
political program of BeC, whereas only a few members of other networks were 
involved (although their claims were also included in the final program). 
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Table 1 – Initiatives in the BeC program and relation with advocacy groups 
Initiative in the BeC program Advocacy groups & networks with similar 
claims and proposals 
Housing policies 
-Creation of social housing 
-Penalising banks that keep empty 
houses in stock 
Anti-eviction social movement (PAH) 
Energy and basic resources provision 
- Energy and water for all families 
-Re-municipalisation of water companies 
Network of associations against energy 
poverty (neighbourhood associations, 
unemployed associations, social movements 
for alternative  models of energy and 
renationalisation of energy companies) 
Special investments for deprived 
neighbourhoods 
Neighbourhood associations of deprived 
neighbourhoods 
Granting human rights to refugees and 
non-legal migrants 
Association against 'internment centres for 
migrants' 
Promoting social economy and 
‘cooperativism’ as a motor for growth 
Cooperatives associations, social and 
solidarity-based economy movement 
Fostering transparency and new forms 
of democratic participation 
Organizations claiming democratic 
regeneration and participative 
experimentation emerging from the 15M 
Source: authors’ own elaboration 
The internal organization and political decisions concerning who was 
going to participate directly in the election of the council were more complex. 
Groups and commissions in BeC were headed by a coordination committee 
(formed by the leaders of the platform) and an executive committee that deals 
with internal issues (also formed by the leaders). Members of both committees 
were elected and their decisions endorsed by a plenary assembly, but they had 
a high degree of autonomy. The coordination committee had the freedom to 
manage all proposals, giving coherence to the program by accepting or modifying 
certain measures. They had autonomy to negotiate the integration of traditional 
political parties in the platform. The initial aim of the platform leaders was to 
integrate party members into the structure of the platform without formal 
negotiation with the party apparatus. Even though this was possible in terms of 
developing the program, with militants from different parties participating 
individually in the thematic and territorial commissions, this was not possible for 
the negotiation of the list and order of candidates. Finally, a more traditional 
process of negotiating to form the coalition took shape, and the electoral list of 
candidates was agreed with left-wing political parties (Podemos, Procés 
Constituent, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, Esquerra Unida I Alternativa and 
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Equo)7. This negotiation occasioned tensions because of the democratic 
organisation of the platform and the openness of decision-making, with some 
participants feeling that the schemes of traditional political parties were being 
reproduced which could lead to co-optation and weakening influence of advocacy 
groups and social movements in the political movement. Nevertheless the final 
electoral list was validated through primaries conducted via electronic poll.  
Towards a new citizenship agenda? 
BeC finished first in the elections of May 2015 with a simple majority and a 
redistributive and participatory program. The new left-wing governing coalition 
has followed a path similar to that of the governing coalition of the years 1980-
1990s, with some differences. One is of political culture and program, the other 
concerns the capacity to govern. As to political culture, the current political 
agenda involves renewing participation and transparency in policy-making to 
strengthen political rights and promoting changes in the hegemonic economic 
model to minimize the effects of economic growth on such rights. The idea is to 
defend social rights through the implementation of an emergency plan (25  out of 
a total of 35 policy measures) to ameliorate the situation of vulnerability of 
hundreds of families:, redistribution is back on Barcelona’s government agenda. 
As for political capacity, BeC does not have a stable majority to implement 
measures and the government needs to establish alliances with other groups8. 
The following table gives some idea of the electoral base supporting BeC and 
why there is such a strong emphasis on vulnerable citizens. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Voting for BeC in municipal elections by district, household income index, 
and percentages of participation  
 
                                                          
7  The left-wing party Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds had continuously supported socialist 
governments between 1979 and 2011. The participation of this party in the coalition brought 
greater knowledge of the organisation of the city council and financial resources, but the 
collaboration  generated reservations as the party was seen as an 'old politics' organisation by 
some members of BeC. 
8  The Elections in Barcelona brought a very fragmented scenario. Barcelona en Comú obtained 
25% of votes and 11 seats. The conservative party CiU obtained 23% and 10 seats. Five other parties 
obtained representation in the city council, ranging from 7 to 11% with the 21 remaining seats unevenly 
distributed. 
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District 
Household 
income 
index 
(2014) 
% vote for 
BeC (2014) 
Participation 
municipal 
elections 2014 
 Participation 
municipal 
elections 2011 
Difference in 
participation 
2014-2011  
Nou Barris 53,7 33,6 55,5 47,6 7,9 
Sant Andreu 73 29,2 61,8 52,8 9 
Sants-Montjuïch 75,8 28,2 58,2 49,6 8,6 
Horta Guinardó 77,7 28,4 58,7 50,7 8 
Ciutat Vella 79,7 35,1 47,6 41,8 5,8 
Sant Martí 85,6 29,3 60,7 52 8,7 
Gràcia 108,5 23,8 64,2 55,8 8,4 
Eixample 115,9 21,2 63,1 56,3 6,8 
Les Corts 139,7 14,8 65,5 59 6,5 
Sarrià-Sant 
Gervasi 
184,3 10,5 66,2 61,6 4,6 
TOTAL 
100 25,2 60,6 53 7,6 
Source: authors’ own elaboration based on 
http://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/eleccionsmunicipals2015/ca/resultats.html 
 With 25% of the electoral vote and with those votes concentrated in the 
lower income districts BeC does not have the city-wide support of the government 
that transformed Barcelona in the 1980s and early 1990s. The social base of the 
BeC vote partly explains the concentration of planned measures linked to 
employment, expenditure on food, energy and water, housing, and the 
improvement of public transport. 
Planned actions aim not only to make the city more socially just but also 
to change the relations between public and private actors in decision makingAs 
regards housing, for instance, the city council has sought such measures as 
already proposed by the anti-eviction movement. They include the creation of a 
negotiating table with banks in order to find alternative solutions to mortgage 
executions and to use non-occupied housing stock owned by banks for social 
housing provision. In parallel, the local government is increasing the stock of 
public social housing through more public investment. Likewise, as regards water 
provision, the city council foresees the re-municipalisation of the local water 
company. 
Despite this, the outcomes of efforts towards creating more social justice 
have been uneven. Private actors have manifested open disagreement with that 
part of the BeC program. And there is lack of institutional support at other levels 
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of government to implement them. This is the case of ensuring the right to 
adequate food, the right to health, to mobility, to a basic supply of water, gas and 
electricity, or to a municipal and complementary basic-income, all of them 
included in the Action plan of BeC that depends on financial resources from the 
regional or the national government. 
The new local government also wants to reinforce political citizenship in 
the sense of strengthening transparency and greater involvement of citizens in 
decision-making processes. This includes making public all the meetings of the 
mayor with different actors and offering better information on public spending and 
auditing agencies that depend on the city council (such as the planning public-
private company Barcelona Regional). They aim is to prevent corruption. 
Concerning participation, the city council is putting into practice the Municipal 
Action Plan and District Action Plans in order to establish priorities at city and 
district levels. These new instruments for participation combine the use of new 
technologies and social media with more traditional meetings and thematic 
meetings in neighbourhoods or with associations working on specific issues. This 
political orientation is in line with what Benoit Levesque defines as a shift to a 
public-value orientation on innovation in public management systems (Levesque, 
2013). It is also interesting to note that the idea of ‘auditing’ previously settled 
contracts goes in the same semantic direction of the general claim, especially 
present in many Southern European radical progressive circles, of ‘revising’ or 
‘auditing’ the public debt assumed by the national governments as a result of the 
2008 financial and economic crisis. 
 
Another area of friction between the new city government and private 
actors results from the aim to promote a new ‘economic model’ giving a more 
prominent role to the social economy. The Mayor has announced her disposition 
to revise the participation of the municipality in specific private business-projects 
or to renegotiate enterprise concessions and privatisations, for example in the 
case of adding big shopping malls. In relation to the booming tourism sector the 
new government envisages an alternative tourism model which might be more 
sustainable and redistributive. So far there is a temporary moratorium on the 
concession of tourist licenses and certifications. – One innovative strategy is to 
use part of the benefits of the economically successful tourism sector to facilitate 
public facilities for small commerce, or the support for non-precarious jobs 
through investing in strategic sectors. These lines of action have been inspired 
by some of the existing social cooperatives in the city.  
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In sum, from the 35 urgent measures included in the original program, 11 
were implemented after four months in power (most of them related to social 
needs) and 10 were under study or early development9. The strong political 
fragmentation in the city council, with Barcelona en Comú having only 11 out of 
41 seats, has forced the city government to negotiate and to limit some of the 
original proposals. In spite of that BeC is firm in defending its citizenship agenda 
wanting to prioritize the ‘common good’ over private interests. In this regard, BeC 
has strengthened the discourse based on social and political rights and the ‘right 
to the city’ renovating and recapturing the original model of urban citizenship 
shaped during the eighties, when local forms of welfare were developed with 
strong support of civil society. 
Conclusions  
 
Citizenship has become in the new century a meaningful horizon for political 
imagination (Hansen, 2015). Despite limitations and critical appraisals the 
centrality of the nation-state in the expansion and implementation of citizenship 
rights during the twenty century cannot be disputed. Welfare and social rights 
were extended to new sectors of the population incorporating issues such as the 
recognition of diversity. However, social and political rights are being threatened 
by the  forces behind globalisation. Since the 1980s globalisation and neo-liberal 
ideas have created serious challenges to welfare institutions and social 
redistributive policies. Mainly in cities, the development of new forms of 
governance has made it easier for non-state actors to resist and fight against the 
loss of social and political rights and to engage in co-defining new citizenship 
agendas. On these new agendas one item among many is establishing ‘moral 
grounds’ for an inclusive citizenship.   
We have here described how, in this framework, social movements and 
advocacy groups develop social action and strategies to advance a ‘new political 
culture’ with a renovated citizenship agenda in Barcelona, part of a wider political 
trend in Spain. We have indicated the close link between this political turn and 
the hardship experienced by sectors of the Spanish population – as in other 
Southern European countries- with the 2008 economic crisis and consequent 
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fiscal austerity. The ideas and forms of such an ‘urban citizenship’ agenda  give 
priority to citizens’ participation and democracy at the local level while aiming to 
strengthen social rights through redistributive policies.   
We have offered this case by way of illustration of the creation of an 
electoral platform able to gain local power, to advance a political program based 
on reshaping social redistributive policies, and to create new participation 
mechanisms. Departing from the initiatives of the Indignados and other social 
movements and advocacy groups, this political platform proposed a new 
citizenship agenda. We have argued that this was possible because the actors 
involved developed networks of trust and shared ideas and objectives. We also 
meant to show that the case of Barcelona indicates the importance of taking into 
account specific local historical contexts and institutional frameworks. In 
Barcelona, there was a prior democratic governance model since the 1980s of 
close involvement of civil society in order to ensure social cohesion. This 
governance model included a redistributive program and certain forms of 
involvement of neighbourhood associations in decision-making. But this model 
declined when leaders gave priority to a competitive strategy of the city in the 
global arena. After a new conservative coalition arrived in power in the midst of 
the economic crisis, some civil society actors and social movements moved to 
prepare and configure a new coalition able to build a new redistributive and 
participatory model.  
BeC is a product of the protests against welfare cuts and their negative 
effects on large sectors of the population and against the distant attitude of 
economic and political elites. Barcelona, as many other cities, has witnessed 
many episodes of corruption and nepotism that lately, in the light of the crisis, 
have become a deep source of citizens’ indignation. The success of the BeC 
platform derives from the social movements related to the 15M movement that 
emerged in 2011, in part of that global wave of mobilisation after the 2008 
financial crisis known as ‘occupy movements’ in many cities around the globe. 
When in 2011 the conservative nationalist party (CiU) won City Council in the 
local elections despite social movements taking the plazas and streets, part of 
the activists and organisations participating in the 15M decided to develop a 
political movement able to reach the institutions.  
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The successful development of the political movement was due in part to 
networks between different social movements and activists developed, not only 
during the wave of protests linked to the Indignados movement, but present long 
before in the city. The civic density of the associations and social movements 
directly or indirectly engaged in the construction of the political confluence 
explains its openness to participation. In fact the construction of a counter-
hegemonic action-plan has attracted people and innovative ideas already 
operating in the city during the last decade.  
Nevertheless, once in power the political movement has suffered from 
different limitations. Firstly, obtaining a limited victory in a very fragmented 
political landscape, the new Mayor has been forced to negotiate with other 
political parties and to adapt the political agenda. Secondly, despite the discourse 
on citizenship rights and participation, not all citizens feel engaged in the political 
project of the coalition. This is specially the case among the middle classes that 
look at the new political project with scepticism. Thirdly, the governing coalition 
faces strong opposition from private actors in most of the measures proposed 
that challenge private interests.  
Finally, the new local government has suffered limitations imposed by 
multi-level governance. The local scale allows the alliance between different 
movements and organizations to formulate a local political agenda, but the 
possibility to implement redistributive policies at the local level is constrained by 
a lack of competenc and resources. The capacity of these movements to scale 
up to other levels of government is limited as the construction of alliances and 
confluences is strongly rooted mainly or only at the local level. This is, probably, 
one of the most salient limitations of urban citizenship. In this regard, the case of 
Barcelona indicate that it is easier for these new political movements to have a 
cultural impact as they put forward new citizenship agendas than to make a clear 
political impact. This has yet to be assessed by history.  
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